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INTRODUCTION
In a world in which police understand themselves to be a bulwark
against crime, having a good handle on crime data is critical. According
to the best data available, crime has been steadily trending downward for
the last few decades. There has been a national decline in crime, and the
decline in New York City across all crime categories has been the most
dramatic.1 Recently, however, some have sounded an alarm regarding
rising crime rates, primarily in big cities.2 In the summer of 2015, their
clarion call was based on what Professor Jeffrey Fagan and I called more
“sophistry than science”: The bulk of their evidence for a crime spike was
*. Walton Hale Hamilton Professor of Law and Director of the Justice
Collaboratory, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Ben Justice and Jeffrey Fagan for
comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Franklin E. Zimring, The City that Became Safe: New York’s Lessons for
Urban Crime and Its Control 1–27 (2012) (charting the decline in crime in New York City
and comparing the magnitude of that decline to the decline in other cities). Speciﬁcally,
Professor Zimring notes that “[t]he homicide rate in New York City [was] 18% of its 1990
total in 2009.” Id. at 4.
2. See, e.g., Heather Mac Donald, Rise in Crime Is a Reason to Fear Anti-Police
Rhetoric, N.Y. Times: Room for Debate, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/
06/04/have-fearful-police-brought-an-end-to-the-drop-in-crime/rise-in-crime-is-a-reason-to-
fear-anti-police-rhetoric (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Oct. 26, 2015,
4:02 PM); see also James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Remarks Delivered at the University of
Chicago Law School: Law Enforcement and the Communities We Serve: Bending the
Lines Toward Safety and Justice (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/law-
enforcement-and-the-communities-we-serve-bending-the-lines-toward-safety-and-justice
[http://perma.cc/KYL2-JW8Z].
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pinned on a comparison of percentage increases over the last year.3
Percentage increases do not mean much when absolute numbers are
small,4 and only two data points do not make a trend. The point of
identifying a trend is to make a claim about the general direction of a set
of data, so one needs more than two points in order to say something
meaningful about the direction of data over time. In 2017, crime still
trends downward in many cities, but there is also data that indicate some
troubling trends. In a handful of cities, crime—especially violent crime—
is going up.5 Cities with notable increases over the last two years include
Baltimore, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.6
I. THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY:
EXPLORING EXISTING SOCIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL,
ANDHISTORICAL RESEARCH
A. Interpreting Crime Reports
Of course, the ability to theorize or speculate on these changes
depends upon the ability to measure changes in crime accurately.
Scholars often measure changes with reference to statistics collected by
the FBI. For over eighty years, the FBI has compiled data as part of its
Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR).7 The FBI collects data from
local agencies and publishes them in an annual report, Crime in the United
States.8 This report is considered the official data set on American crime.
It is slow, imprecise, and subject to manipulation.9 Moreover, because of
3. See Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Crime Statistics Don’t Show that the Sky
Is Falling, N.Y. Times: Room for Debate, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2015/06/04/have-fearful-police-brougt-an-end-to-the-drop-in-crime/crime-statistics-dont-
show-that-the-sky-is-falling (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Dec. 19,
2015, 6:07 PM).
4. Id.
5. See generally Matthew Friedman, Ames C. Grawert & James Cullen, Brennan Ctr.
for Justice, Crime in 2016: A Preliminary Analysis 1–2 (2016),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/Crime_2016_Preliminary
_Analysis.pdf [http://perma.cc/2VSW-JVBY] (noting that in “speciﬁc cities, especially
Chicago,” crime data show an “urgent need to address violence” and that the “murder
rate is projected to rise by 13.1 percent [in 2016], with nearly half of this increase
attributable to Chicago . . . .”).
6. Id. at 12.
7. FBI UCR Publications, FBI: Unif. Crime Reporting, http://ucr.fbi.gov/ucr-
publications [http://perma.cc/BZQ9-APYN] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
8. Id.
9. See FBI’s National Crime Data Found to Be Flawed, Manipulated, Prison Legal
News (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2013/apr/15/fbis-national-
crime-data-found-to-be-ﬂawed-manipulated/ [http://perma.cc/MJQ2-TDZB]; Aviva Shen,
What Happens When People Panic About Crime Rates, ThinkProgress (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://thinkprogress.org/what-happens-when-people-panic-about-crime-rates-
8ef19aae2a0b [http://perma.cc/G2BN-YXQY] (describing how manipulation of crime
statistics is used to accomplish varying ends).
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the way the data are collected, it is difficult to use the UCR for anything
beyond macro trends with respect to very general categories of crime.
Some researchers look to calls for service as a better data source to detect
changes in the reality of crime on the ground.10 Calls-for-service
databases contain both 911 (and sometimes 311) calls and police-
initiated events.11 Such data may also be an important source for
understanding the relationship between the public and the police. So
much of our understanding of the relationship between changes in
crime and the interactions policing agencies have with the communities
they serve depends on having relatively granular, real-time measures of
crime. Reliance upon grosser categories and large time gaps for change
will necessarily mask these responses.12
In a recent study, Professors Matthew Desmond, David Kirk, and
Andrew Papachristos present an example of how researchers can use
such data.13 The researchers studied how police brutality against
unarmed Black men affects cities and the Black community in particular
by examining whether there was a change in the number of 911 calls in
Milwaukee before and after a highly publicized incident of police
violence against an unarmed Black man, Frank Jude.14 Jude was attacked
by several White police officers in October 2004 after they accused him
of stealing a police officer’s badge at a party.15 The officers stomped on
his face with heavy boots and punctured his eardrums with pens.16 After
the incident, Jude’s photo was shown in the newspaper demonstrating his
10. See David A. Klinger & George S. Bridges, Measurement Error in Calls-for-Service
as an Indicator of Crime, 35 Criminology 705, 706 (1997) (collecting and summarizing
studies suggesting the superiority of the calls-for-service measure); see also Anthony A.
Braga, Hot Spots Policing and Crime Prevention: A Systematic Review of Randomized
Controlled Trials, 1 J. Experimental Criminology 317, 322 (2005) (noting appropriate
measures of crime include calls for service).
11. See Alison Wakeﬁeld & Jenny Fleming, The SAGE Dictionary of Policing 17–19
(2009) (deﬁning calls for service and explaining the beneﬁts of this data source).
12. Cf. Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on
Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003–2010, 31 Just. Q. 96, 118
(2012) (explaining in a related context that annual measures of crime mask subannual
effects of policing strategies).
13. Matthew Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Police Violence and
Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81 Am. Soc. Rev. 857 (2016)
[hereinafter Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting]. Recently,
Professors Desmond and Papachristos summarized the results of this study in the New York
Times opinion pages. Matthew Desmond & Andrew V. Papachristos, Why Don’t You Just
Call the Cops?, N.Y. Times (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/
opinion/why-dont-you-just-call-the-cops.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Desmond & Papachristos, Call the Cops].
14. See Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting, supra note 13,
at 859.
15. Id. at 860.
16. Id.
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extensive injuries.17 The results of the researchers’ analysis of 911 calls
surrounding this incident are startling. After Jude’s beating was reported
in the local press, Milwaukee residents—and especially residents of
Milwaukee’s Black neighborhoods—were less likely to report crimes by
calling 911.18 The magnitude of the crime-call decline in Milwaukee was
large and long lasting. It persisted for over a year, “result[ing] in a loss of
approximately 22,200 911 calls, a 17 percent reduction in citizen crime
reporting, compared with the expected number of calls.”19 Moreover, the
“missing” calls were primarily conﬁned to the areas of Milwaukee in
which mostly African Americans lived.20 After a year, the number of calls
went up again.21
Among other things, these big swings in the number of 911 calls in
Milwaukee cast new light on the so-called “Ferguson Effect.” The Chief
of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department was the ﬁrst to use the
term “Ferguson Effect” as a way to explain an increase in crime following
social unrest and protests in the aftermath of the death of Michael Brown
in Ferguson, Missouri.22 The term was later popularized by Heather Mac
Donald23 and then caught on in the media.24 While early (generously
17. Id.
18. Id. at 865–66. Importantly, Professors Desmond, Kirk, and Papachristos’s analysis
controlled for crime rates, previous calling patterns, and neighborhood characteristics. Id.
at 862. The authors also tested whether calls for automobile crashes changed before and
after the Jude beating to ensure that another event, such as staff capacity at 911 call
centers, was not the source of declining calls. Id. at 868. Because the crash calls remained
constant through the test period, this analysis revealed that the decline was speciﬁc to
crime calls. Id.
19. Desmond & Papachristos, Call the Cops, supra note 13; see also Desmond et al.,
Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting, supra note 13, at 867 (providing charts
noting the same).
20. See Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting, supra note 13,
at 870 (explaining the “Jude Effect” was largely conﬁned to “Black Milwaukee”).
21. See id. at 871 (explaining that over time, reporting returned to normal levels).
22. See Christine Byers, Crime up After Ferguson and More Police Needed, Top St.
Louis Area Chiefs Say, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Nov. 15, 2014),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/crime-up-after-ferguson-and-
more-police-needed-top-st/article_04d9f99f-9a9a-51be-a231-1707a57b50d6.html
[http://perma.cc/J4FB-ZEB4]. Note, however, that the idea that there was an increase at
all was highly contested—trends require at least three data points! See infra note 24
(citing sources that discuss evidence as to whether there was a crime increase).
23. See Heather Mac Donald, The New Nationwide Crime Wave, Wall St. J. (May 29,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-nationwide-crime-wave-1432938425 (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review).
24. See, e.g., Matt Ford, Debunking the Ferguson Effect, Atlantic (Nov. 21, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/ferguson-effect/416931/
[http://perma.cc/CTB4-5EY6]; Neil Gross, Is There a ‘Ferguson Effect’?, N.Y. Times
(Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/opinion/sunday/is-there-a-
ferguson-effect.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); John Kass, Chicago Cop Is the
Face of the Ferguson Effect, Chi. Trib. (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
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described) analyses of the “Ferguson Effect” relied on rather crude
crime measures, such as year-to-date comparisons and only one prior
data point, the recent analysis of the much more ﬁne-grained 911 call
data suggests that the spike in reported crime may have resulted not
from police failing to do their jobs—police “going fetal”25—but instead
from a return to a normal pattern of reporting incidents after an
unnaturally low dip. This sequence, a period of low reporting of crime
incidents followed by a normalization of reporting, created an
appearance of a spike in crime.
B. Exploring “Legal Cynicism”
The fact that people would decline to call the police to report crime
after a serious incident of police brutality is, to put it mildly, concerning.
It means that some people are making decisions not to call on public
servants who have sworn to protect and help them even after they have
been seriously victimized. Declining to call police after one has been
victimized is a behavior that is an order of magnitude different from a
person telling a pollster that she does not like or trust police.26
Sociologists over time have developed theories to explain how
people negotiate their relationship to legal authority when they
experience both high levels of neighborhood crime and intense policing
to address private predation. For example, Professors Robert Sampson
and Dawn Bartusch found, paradoxically, that Chicago neighborhoods
experience widespread tolerance of subcultural deviance: Residents
refuse to report violations of law to the police while simultaneously
condemning deviance at higher levels than residents of areas where
people claim greater propensity to call the police.27
This phenomenon, which Professors Sampson and Bartusch call
“legal cynicism,” has been explored by other scholars. In ethnographic
work, Professor Elijah Anderson has explained that when people believe
they cannot rely on legal authorities, they take the law into their own
news/columnists/kass/ct-ferguson-effect-chicago-police-1007-20161006-column.html (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
25. “Going fetal” refers, of course, to Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s speculation
about a supposed slowdown in police activity following social unrest and protest and an
attendant increase in crime. See John Byrne, Emanuel Blames Chicago Crime Uptick on
Officers Second-Guessing Themselves, Chi. Trib. (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-emanuel-fetal-police-met-20151012-story.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
26. See Bruce Drake, Divide Between Blacks and Whites on Police Runs Deep, Pew
Res. Ctr.: Fact Tank (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/28/
blacks-whites-police/ [http://perma.cc/59RL-TKVB] (describing various surveys
identifying a racial divide on perceptions of police performance and community trust).
27. See Robert J. Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and
(Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences,
32 Law & Soc’y Rev. 777, 800–01 (1998).
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hands and operate according to a “code of the streets.”28 By
demonstrating that declines in poverty do not mitigate the high levels of
legal cynicism associated with persistent levels of homicide, Professors
Kirk and Papachristos have shown that legal cynicism has serious
consequences for the health and well-being of neighborhoods.29 It is only
recently, however, that scholars have been able to document the scale
and dimension of the problem in such a precise way as Professors
Desmond, Kirk, and Papachristos were able to in their study.
C. Perceptions of Fairness
Research on the sociology of legal cynicism overlaps with research in
psychology concerning how people come to conclusions about whether
authorities are fair. Psychology is implicated here because we must
understand what it means for someone to conclude that legal authorities,
like the police, are legitimate in order to conclude that citizen
disengagement reﬂects public perceptions of those authorities’
illegitimacy. This research in psychology focuses not upon a
philosophical explanation of legitimacy but rather seeks to understand
how people make decisions to voluntarily comply with the law, defer to
requests from authorities, and cooperate and engage with them.30
The psychological research extends over multiple decades and is
grounded in work from the 1960s focused on distributive justice.31 Early
researchers argued that people’s sense of the equitable distribution of
costs and beneﬁts determined their sense of fairness: People will be more
likely to believe that a just outcome is fair when they receive an outcome
they feel that they deserve.32 One problem with the research, though, was
that it consistently showed that people were less concerned with unfair
allocations in outcomes than with their treatment in the process of
getting those outcomes.33 So another group of scholars started to
research decisionmaking procedures. Those scholars showed that people
expressed commitments to the particular ways in which decisionmaking
28. Elijah Anderson, Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the
Inner City 66–67 (1999).
29. See David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Cultural Mechanisms and the
Persistence of Neighborhood Violence, 116 Am. J. Soc. 1190, 1228–29 (2011).
30. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 57–68 (2006) [hereinafter
Tyler, Why People Obey the Law] (revealing study results suggesting that people obey the
law when they believe it is legitimate and examining policy conclusions from this result).
31. See generally E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural
Justice 10–12 (1988) (describing early theories of distributive justice and its inﬂuence on
future research).
32. See id. at 63–83.
33. See id. at 77–78 (“[T]he legitimacy measure is more strongly inﬂuenced by
procedural fairness judgments than by distributive fairness judgments.”); see also Tyler,
Why People Obey the Law, supra note 30, at 78–80 (explaining the difference between
distributive fairness and procedural fairness).
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was carried out independent of the outcomes that were ultimately
produced. Professors Allan Lind and Tom Tyler crystallized the insight in
their path-breaking book, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice, by
demonstrating that people appear to understand the ways in which legal
authorities treat them not as information about outcome control, as was
originally thought, but instead as opportunities to gather information
about how legal authorities view them and the group or groups to which
they belong.34
People tend to place much more weight on how authorities exercise
power as opposed to the ends for which that power is exercised. Since
Professors Lind and Tyler published their book, researchers have studied
public evaluations of judges, political leaders, managers, and teachers,
and the ﬁndings are consistent: Conclusions regarding legitimacy are
tied more closely to judgments of the fairness of actions than to
evaluations of the fairness of outcomes or effectiveness of actors in
achieving outcomes.35 In other words, the relationship between the
public and how authorities make decisions is inherently relational
instead of instrumental. Although much of the early work focused on
decisionmaking by the courts and organizational leaders,36 some scholars
have recently applied the decades of research on procedural justice to
policing. They have learned that people are more satisﬁed with police
decisions when they believe that the police are exercising their authority
through fair procedures.37 Studies further indicate that people are more
34. See Lind & Tyler, supra note 31, at 230–37 (explaining group value theory).
35. See Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of
Procedural Justice, 123 Yale L.J. Forum 525, 529–35 (2014), http://www.
yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-sotomayor-and-the-jurisprudence-of-procedural-
justice [http://perma.cc/F5YB-K32G] (summarizing the literature).
36. See, e.g., Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, supra note 30, at 109–10 (discussing
research from the 1970s through the 1990s considering procedural justice in the courts);
Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understanding the Interaction Between Procedural and
Distributive Justice: The Role of Trust, in Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and
Research 390, 395 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (referencing the
“diversity of studies” exploring “how people reacted to their encounters with legal
authorities” and “how employees responded to organizational changes”).
37. See Lyn Hinds, Building Police–Youth Relationships: The Importance of
Procedural Justice, 7 Youth Just. 195, 206 (2007) (concluding that “young people’s views
of the legitimacy of police are positively linked to police use of procedural justice”); Tal
Jonathan-Zamir & David Weisburd, The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents of
Police Legitimacy: Findings from a Quasi-Experiment in Israel, 50 J. Res. Crime & Delinq.
3, 5 (2013) (ﬁnding that in Israeli communities, procedural justice is consistently “the
primary antecedent of [police] legitimacy”); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Proﬁling
and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of
Police Authority, 42 Criminology 253, 276 (2004) (demonstrating conformance of the
procedural justice model with people’s beliefs about whether they have been proﬁled by
police).
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willing to defer to police decisions when they feel the police are acting
fairly.38
Procedural justice turns out to be the key in determining whether
the public will conclude that legal authorities behave fairly. Research is
clear that perceptions of procedural justice depend upon four factors.39
First, participation and voice are critical. People report higher levels of
satisfaction in encounters with authorities when they have an opportunity
to explain their situation and perspective on that situation.40 Even when
people are aware that their participation will not impact the outcome,
they nonetheless want to be taken seriously and listened to.41 Second,
people care a great deal about the fairness of decisionmaking by
authorities.42 That is, they look to indicia of decisionmaker neutrality,
objectivity, factuality, consistency, and transparency (as well as
transparency in decisionmaking as a general matter across cases). In this
way, it turns out that it matters a great deal to people in their interactions
with legal authorities whether the decisionmaker takes the time to
explain what he or she is doing and why.43 Third, people care a great deal
about how they are treated by legal authorities such as police officers.44
Speciﬁcally, people desire to be treated with dignity, respect for their
rights, and politeness.45 Note, however, that procedural justice cannot
38. See Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to
Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 983, 1014–15 (2000) (arguing
procedural justice shapes the willingness of the members of both majority and minority
ethnic groups to defer to law and legal authorities); see also Lorraine Mazerolle et al.,
Shaping Citizen Perceptions of Police Legitimacy: A Randomized Field Trial of Procedural
Justice, 51 Criminology 33, 55 (2013) (using randomized ﬁeld experiment testing varying
police behavior to demonstrate that procedural justice shapes police legitimacy); Tom R.
Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority:
Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement, 20 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 78,
78–79 (2014) (examining Americans’ views about the police and the courts to
demonstrate that procedural justice shapes legitimacy, compliance, and cooperation). In
these studies the notion of fairness is captured by the factors of procedural justice.
39. See Comm. to Review Research on Police Policy & Practices, Nat’l Research
Council, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence 304 (Wesley Skogan &
Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) [hereinafter Nat’l Research Council, Fairness and Effectiveness
in Policing] (describing the four factors as participation, neutrality, treatment signifying




43. See Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 37, at 277 (explaining the relevance of quality
decisionmaking and transparency in policing).
44. See Nat’l Research Council, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing, supra note 39,
at 304.
45. Id.; see also Mazerolle et al., supra note 38, at 34–35 (discussing a study
contrasting two types of routine traffic stops in which the experimental condition speciﬁed
that the officer follow a script operationalizing the key components of procedural justice).
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simply be condensed into this single factor.46 Fourth, in their interactions
with authorities, people want to believe that authorities are acting out of
a sense of benevolence toward them.47 That is, people attempt to discern
why authorities are acting the way they are by assessing how they are
acting. They want to trust that the motivations of the authorities are
sincere and well intentioned. Basically, members of the public want to
believe that the authority they are dealing with believes that they count
and cares about them. In relationships with law enforcement, the public
makes this assessment by evaluating how police officers treat them.
D. Examining Relationships (Past and Present)
Importantly, the public’s understanding of the legitimacy of any
legal authority, but especially the police, is not merely transactional. A
person’s own interactions with the police and her perception of the legit-
imacy of police in general matter, but so do the relationships that she has
with others who have their own interactions with police. And, the
perception of legitimacy is further inﬂuenced by how interactions with
police have occurred over time. Trustworthiness implicates history. It
matters that young men of color today tell stories of being stopped,
beaten, or having their friends killed by police for reasons that do not
quite add up—or, worse, for no reason at all—and it matters that there is
a through-line of such stories going back decades.48 It matters that the
historical relationship between police and so many people in
communities of color includes participation by law enforcement in
lynchings and denial of civil rights to African Americans.49 In these
46. Too often, police officials and even scholars conﬂate the idea of simply being
polite to citizens with pursuing procedural justice principles. For example, in their recent
book, Professors Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Don Patrick Haider-Markel
argue that Professor Tyler’s theory of procedural justice is undermined by the fact that
African American drivers were dissatisﬁed with police interactions even when police acted
politely. See Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody & Donald Haider-Markel, Pulled
Over: How Police Stops Deﬁne Race and Citizenship 114–20 (2014). I have argued that
such an assessment ignores the importance of the other aspects of procedural justice.
Indeed, Professor Epp and his colleagues’ own ﬁndings can be interpreted to demonstrate
that African American motorists can recognize the difference between being stopped for
good reasons and bad (or no reason at all), an issue clearly consonant with the fair
decisionmaking factor of procedural justice. See Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social
Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 335, 345–46 (2014).
47. See Nat’l Research Council, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing, supra note 39,
at 304.
48. Cf. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–72 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(describing the “indignity” of a stop when an officer is “looking for more” and
recognizing that “it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this
type of scrutiny”).
49. With respect to lynchings, see generally Equal Justice Initiative, Lynching in
America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror (2d ed. 2015), http://eji.org/
sites/default/ﬁles/lynching-in-america-second-edition-summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/
36E6-VZCN] (providing a history of lynching and noting that many lynchings occurred in
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communities it was often the police themselves who literally put
handcuffs on wrists of Black men before the noose was tightened around
their necks, or who looked away when mobs tore men out of their homes
and away from their families for failing to respect whiteness.50
The fact that state action has played and continues to play such a
powerful role in signaling to people the ways in which people make sense
of how they do or do not belong in society is essential. It means that it is
not adequate to deﬁne good policing simply in terms of whether law
enforcement officers effectively address crime; rather, police must
understand themselves as vehicles through which individuals understand
themselves as citizens.51 In an analysis of concepts of procedural justice
applied to populations in the United Kingdom, Professors Ben Bradford,
Kristina Murphy, and Jonathan Jackson offer a compelling view: police
officers as “mirrors.”52 The argument here is quite straightforward. Fair
treatment by police increases a person’s identiﬁcation with national
identity while poor treatment undermines it.53 Interestingly, then,
procedural justice is not important only to how an individual
understands her relationship to state and legal authority but also to how
she understands herself in relation to other groups.
the context of criminal allegations against Black people); see also Charles Ramsey, TEDx
Talks, Mending Broken Trust: Police and the Communities They Serve, YouTube (Feb. 8,
2016), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbNCatXqcLw (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (explaining that a key signal of police involvement in lynchings is photos showing
the victims’ wrists handcuffed behind their backs). That police played an active role in the
denial of civil rights, especially voting rights, to Black Americans in southern states is well
known.
50. See Brian Greer, Little Rock’s Last Lynching Was in 1927, but the Terrible
Memories Linger, Ark. Times (Aug. 4, 2000), http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/little-
rocks-last-lynching-was-in-1927-but-the-terrible-memories-linger/Content?oid=2378104
[http://perma.cc/6JCY-4T2J] (describing police involvement in lynchings in Arkansas
and elsewhere); Brentin Mock, The ‘Great Migration’ Was About Racial Terror, Not Jobs,
CityLab (June 24, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2015/06/the-great-migration-
was-about-racial-terror-not-jobs/396722/ [http://perma.cc/6AJG-DWL9] (asserting that
“terror and violence” in the South caused African Americans to ﬂee to northern cities).
51. See Benjamin Justice & Tracey L. Meares, How the Criminal Justice System
Educates Citizens, 651 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 159, 167 (2014) (using
curriculum theory to explain that how police treat people teaches them a great deal about
their status as citizens).
52. Ben Bradford, Kristina Murphy & Jonathan Jackson, Officers as Mirrors: Policing,
Procedural Justice and the (Re)Production of Social Identity, 54 British J. Criminology
527, 543 (2014) (suggesting “when people felt the police were fair in a general sense,
and/or felt they had been personally fairly treated by officers, the strength of their
identiﬁcation with this group was enhanced, and they granted the police more
legitimacy”).
53. Id. at 528.
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II. MOVING FORWARD
This wide range of research naturally raises the question of what to
do. One thing is clear: A focus on—and demand that police focus on—
changing crime rates to the exclusion of other issues that are equally, if
not more, important, such as enhancing trust in police, is a serious
problem. That is why in 2015, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing—on which I had the honor of serving—stood up building trust
and legitimacy as the ﬁrst pillar of our recommendations to President
Obama.54 Building trust and legitimacy was the foundation on which
each one of the ﬁfty-nine recommendations that the Task Force provided
to the President rested.55
With respect to this positive vision there is a caution, however. The
recent empirical research discussed above that powerfully suggests that
police can be community builders, of course, brings with it concerns
about mission creep: Police already worry and complain that the public
views them as social workers and expects them to respond to every
problem that makes life in urban America difficult.56 The reality is that it
is unfair to expect police to solve what is fundamentally a social safety net
problem with the crude tools of crime ﬁghting simply because they are
available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and 365 days a year.
And, as Professor Elizabeth Hinton shows, there is a long history in this
country of turning social welfare problems into crime problems with
respect to the African American community.57
Even granting these issues, policing agencies are not without
pathways to change. First, the law enforcement community must
acknowledge the necessity of a new goal for policing. Crime reduction at
all costs does not provide a warrant for aggressive proactive policing.58
54. See President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 9–18 (2015), http://cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q89P-LLMR] (describing
Pillar 1).
55. Id. at 1 (describing trust and legitimacy as the “foundational principle”).
56. Chief Edward Flynn of Milwaukee spoke compellingly of this challenge at a town
hall meeting with President Obama. See Ashley Sears, “A Way to Cross Parallel
Conversations:” Chief Flynn Speaks with President Obama at Town Hall, Fox6 (July 15,
2016, 9:33 PM), http://fox6now.com/2016/07/15/a-way-to-cross-parallel-conversations-
chief-ﬂynn-speaks-with-president-obama-at-town-hall/ [http://perma.cc/Q3FP-NVJB].
57. See Elizabeth Kai Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The
Making of Mass Incarceration in America 30–32 (2016) (arguing that President Lyndon
Johnson’s poverty programs paved the way for harsh criminal justice policies that deeply
affected African Americans); see also Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of
Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America 101–05 (2010)
(detailing how, at the turn of the century, Progressives addressed White immigrants’
involvement in crime with social service support, while Blacks received punishment in the
criminal justice system).
58. Note a similar statement by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing.
Recommendation 1.6 states: “Law enforcement agencies should consider the potential
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Instead, policing agencies should commit to the ideas that all lives are
valuable, that the state should endeavor to protect everyone, and that a
person’s rights and dignity must always be observed. Fortunately, police
are taking steps in this direction.59 For example, the new emphasis on de-
escalation training is a critical aspect of the acknowledgement that, in
civilian encounters, police must limit the loss of life and avoid harm even
when they are legally entitled to use deadly force.60
But changes such as these simply nibble around the edges of the
problem. Consider an analogy. Former Cleveland District Attorney Tim
McGinty lamented, when announcing at a press conference that a
Cleveland grand jury had declined to bring charges against the officer
who shot and killed Tamir Rice, that the shooting was a “perfect storm of
human error, mistakes and miscommunication.”61 Imagine if Prosecutor
McGinty were a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulator as
opposed to a county prosecutor. Who would be satisﬁed by his statement
that a plane crash that caused the loss of a soul (common industry
parlance used to refer to the number of people on an aircraft) was the
result of a “perfect storm”? More likely, the expectation would be that
every aspect of the machine would be overhauled and those operating it
would be examined, questioned, and trained in order to ensure that the
incident did not reoccur. This analysis would be expected because
“safety” is the cornerstone of the agency’s mission—safety for everybody,
not just pilots and crew members.62
Obviously, policing is not just like ﬂying an airplane, but regulatory
approaches such as those the FAA follows can teach a great deal to those
who work in law enforcement. Start with the mission statement. Rather
than crime reduction at all costs, the goal of policing should reﬂect the
public’s expectation that those responsible for protecting us from one
damage to public trust when implementing crime ﬁghting strategies. Crime reduction is
not self-justifying. Overly aggressive law enforcement strategies can potentially harm
communities and do lasting damage to public trust, as numerous witnesses over multiple
listening sessions observed.” President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, supra note
54, at 16.
59. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Success Story Map, Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs.,
http://cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2827 [http://perma.cc/GKJ6-BU9K] (last visited
Feb. 1, 2017) (depicting places where agencies have implemented the recommendations
of the President’s Task Force, including statewide efforts).
60. See Timothy Williams, Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-
escalate, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/long-
taught-to-use-force-police-warily-learn-to-de-escalate.html?_r=0 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting the prevalence of de-escalation programs throughout the country).
61. Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga Cty. Prosecutor, Statement on the Decision of the
Grand Jury in the Tamir Rice Case (Dec. 28, 2015), http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/
en-US/SYN//68177/NewsDetailTemplate.aspx [http://perma.cc/QE47-CPCN].
62. Mission, Fed. Aviation Admin., http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/ [http://
perma.cc/D54M-TS4S] (last visited Mar. 16, 2017) (“Our continuing mission is to provide
the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.”).
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another should understand that their ﬁrst mission is to protect the
sanctity of life—all life, equally.63
To undertake this work, retraining of police officers and leaders is
necessary. It is a point of ﬁrst order to teach police that a commitment to
enhancing their own public legitimacy is at least as, if not more,
important than the technology of crime reduction.64 Additionally, it is
extremely difficult for managers to expect police officers to treat
members of the public in ways consistent with procedural justice when
police officers themselves are rarely treated with procedural justice in
their workplaces.65 Finally, agencies can do more to simply acknowledge
their participation in discrimination and wrongdoing historically and in
the present.66 Terrence Cunningham, the president of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the police chief of Wellesley,
Massachusetts, took a step in this direction at the IACP’s annual meeting
this past October in San Diego.67 Cunningham issued a formal apology to
the nation’s minority population “for the actions of the past and the role
that our profession has played in society’s historical mistreatment of
communities of color.”68 Some ridiculed the statement as “cheap talk,”
and that reaction certainly is understandable.69 But, in light of the impact
63. This mission statement does not seem to align clearly with the “law and order”
platform of current President Donald Trump. See Standing Up for Our Law Enforcement
Community, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/law-enforcement-community
[http://perma.cc/A67K-F7FH] (last updated Feb. 1, 2017) (“The Trump Administration
will be a law and order administration.”).
64. See President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, supra note 54, at 9–18, 44–
45 (describing recommendation 4.4. and recommendation 1.6 of Pillar 1, which specify
that “crime reduction is not self-justifying” and “[c]ommunities should support a culture
and practice of policing that reﬂects the values of protection and promotion of the dignity
of all,” respectively).
65. Id. at 14 (“1.4 Recommendation: Law enforcement agencies should promote
legitimacy internally within the organization by applying the principles of procedural
justice.”).
66. Id. at 12 (“1.2 Recommendation: Law enforcement agencies should acknowledge
the role of policing in past and present injustice and discrimination and how it is a hurdle
to the promotion of community trust.”).
67. See Terrence M. Cunningham, President, Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Remarks
at the 2016 IACP Annual Conference and Exposition: The Law Enforcement Profession
and Historical Injustices (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.iacp.org/ViewResult?SearchID=2690
[http://perma.cc/9GNQ-7W5Z]; see also Tom Jackman, U.S. Police Chiefs Group




68. Cunningham, supra note 67.
69. Evan Allen, Wellesley’s Police Chief Apologizes for Historical Injustices, Bos.
Globe (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/10/18/wellesley-
police-chief-apology-draws-praise/utO4QozuEPWhxzjRUy9GeI/story.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting that while Cunningham’s speech received praise, “[o]thers
said that words, no matter how well-meaning, were no replacement for action, and
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of incidents such as the beating of Frank Jude on the formation—and
destruction—of public trust, it is difficult to conclude that the gesture is
completely meaningless.
questioned why Cunningham had not acknowledged that racism within police
departments was still a problem today”).


